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1. Introduction 
 
This paper develops a life cycle wage-hours contract model.  It adopts a human 
capital approach in which the worker and the firm seek to share rent optimally when 
faced with the problem of asymmetric information.
1
  It is a four-period model, covering 
initial investment, post-investment, pre-retirement and retirement periods. The contract is 
specified in relation to wage earnings - i.e. the hourly wage rate multiplied by weekly 
hours - and not simply the hourly wage rate.  The fact the parties bargain over both the 
wage rate and working hours is well understood in the firm-union bargaining literature 
(Pencavel, 1991; Trejo, 1993).  Far less recognition has been given to the broader role of 
working time within rent sharing contracts. From a policy perspective, our model allows 
us to investigate an important, yet under-researched, aspect of working time over the life 
cycle. Thus, while numerous papers have been devoted to the reasons for and the 
consequences of retirement decisions, relatively few studies have investigated wage-
hours decisions as retirement approaches.  A notable exception is the paper by Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1986) who are also interested in hours of work within an optimal labour 
supply life cycle model. 
Human capital returns to acquired work skills and organisational know-how have 
implications for both extensive and intensive labour margins (Hart and Ma, 2000). The 
first of these, and the one most researched in the literature, is the length of job tenure. 
Given rent sharing agreements, higher investments may be expected, ceteris paribus, to 
induce longer tenure. Preventing losses of positive joint rents through sub-optimal quits 
                                 
1Malcomson (1999) provides a review of this class of model, including a comparative evaluation with other 
rent sharing approaches. 
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and layoffs is the extensive margin goal of the wage contract.  To the extent that 
investments involve firm-specific skills, then quits and layoffs also influence returns in 
subsequent jobs.  The intensive margin concerns the worker's per-period utilisation, 
measured in terms of daily or weekly average hours of work. In this case, it is well known 
that higher investments would be expected, ceteris paribus, to induce longer average 
hours of work (e.g. Ehrenberg, 1971).   The degree of investment amortisation is 
dependent both on length of tenure and on intensity of work per-period.  If the wage rate 
is set to minimise separations for given hours, the contract solution will not be fully 
efficient if hours are themselves not optimal.  
The four-period approach allows us to move beyond establishing that wages rise 
with work experience since it discriminates between wage rises in the early and later 
years of tenure. A particularly important generalisation is that we are able to move away 
from a simple dichotomy between initial and post-investment periods.  In our framework, 
investment within the firm may be undertaken in periods 1 and 2.  This allows us to 
produce results about relative investment intensities in the early and later stages of on-
the-job experience and, therefore, to investigate the curvature of wage profile over the life 
cycle.  It is shown that hours also rise with work experience and, as with the wage-rate, 
we are able to evaluate likely hours profiles with respect to early and later years of tenure.  
We are also concerned with the inter-relatedness of wage and hours decisions. Thus, we 
investigate relative income effects between wages and working time, again differentiating 
between early and later years of tenure. This dimension of our work underlines the fact 
that modelling the intensive margin of the firm's operation would appear to be an 
essential requirement in the evolution of compensation over the life cycle.  We might 
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expect, for example, that income effects are significantly different during the pre-
retirement period compared to early years of job tenure.  
On the empirical side, we estimate separate wage rate and hours growth equations 
using individual-level data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991-2003.  
We simulate the combined wage-hour effects in order to examine decompositions of the 
related wage/hours/earnings-experience profiles.  Further, in the light of theoretical 
derivations, we differentiate between workers whose last job change occurred a 
considerable time before the age of retirement and those who changed jobs nearer to 
retirement.  Like the symmetric-information implicit risk-sharing model of Beaudry and 
DiNardo (1995), our model predicts that hours are influenced by wages through an 
income effect.  Additionally, we predict that hours are determined by work experience.  A 
key empirical finding is that the positive impact of rent sharing on hours more than 
offsets the negative income effect.  Hours rise with experience over the life cycle.  
We allow for both specific and general human capital investments.   
Conventionally, we treat specific capital as having zero-return in the alternative 
employment.  Period 1 is the investment period when the worker is young.  Period 2 then 
accommodates the possibilities that the worker stays with the firm or moves - through 
either a quit or a layoff - to an alternative firm.  If the worker stays, then the parties share 
the post-investment return to period 1 investments.  They also undertake additional 
investment, the returns to which are realised in period 3.  If the parties separate, then 
period 2 marks the investment period in the new firm.  Period 3 is the post-investment 
period.  Finally, the worker retires at the beginning of period 4.  Moving from a three-
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period (e.g. Johnson, 1996) to a four-period modelling perspective adds to modelling 
complexity, but permits richer insights into the evolutions of wages and hours profiles. 
 
2. Background framework  
The wage-hour contracts adopt the basic modelling approaches of Hashimoto 
(1979) and Carmichael (1983). The analysis is conducted in terms of the marginal worker 
whose initial wage earnings are determined on a perfectly competitive spot market.  At 
the outset, the firm and the worker must ‘take’ the initial wage-hours combination 
determined in the market place.  Subsequently, training endows the worker with firm-
specific skills and so in the second period rent sharing arising from this accrued return 
allows the parties to deviate from spot earnings thereby producing potentially different 
wage-hours combinations.   
The marginal worker receives contractual wage wi in the i-th period.  The 
worker's pre-entry endowment of general human capital is worth w1 in the open market 
and this is not augmented within the firm.  Both parties are risk neutral.2  The firm 
provides specific training at a cost, C(Mi), where Mi is the (uncertain) amount of human 
capital in the i-th period.  Ex ante, each party knows only the distributions of ηi (the 
disturbance on the  post-training productivity in the i-th period) and θi (the post-training 
job satisfaction of the  workers in the i-th period).  The density functions of ηi and θi are 
f(ηi) and q(θi) with E(θi) = E(ηi) = Cov(ηi,θi) = 0.  Ex post, information cannot be 
exchanged; separation decisions are made independently.  
                                 
2 These convenient simplifying assumptions follow earlier related papers (e.g. Carmichael, 1983).  
Assuming risk aversion on the part of workers does not change our results qualitatively. 
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General and specific elements of human capital acquired within the firm are 
treated in much of the existing literature as if it is possible, a priori, to demarcate strictly 
between them. This is highly unlikely in practice. Especially where jobs involve complex 
sets of functional and organisational requirements, it would be difficult to assess 
definitively which parts of skill acquisition and know-how are of potential use in 
alternative employment and which are not.  Accordingly, we assume that the proportion 
of general human capital is a random variable ε with a distribution of v(.).  If the worker 
leaves the firm at the end of a period, we assume that the outside firm knows whether 
separation is due to the worker being fired or quitting voluntarily.  If the worker is fired, 
this is regarded as a signal that skills have not been acquired to a satisfactory level.  In 
this event, the worker does not gain any increase of general human capital.  If the worker 
quits, his general human capital will increase by a proportion, with ∫= 1
0
)( εεε dvg , where 
0 ≤ g ≤ 1. 
 
The probability of a worker deciding to quit at the end of period i-1 is 
∫
∞−
==
*
)()( *
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θθθ                       (1) 
while the probability of the firm wanting to fire a worker at the end of period i-1 is 
∫
∞−
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*
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i
iiii dfFF
η
ηηη                     (2) 
where θi* is the level of job satisfaction that leaves the worker indifferent about leaving 
and ηi* is the level of productivity that leaves the firm indifferent over employing the 
worker.  In period i-1, specific training C(Mi) is expected to raise hourly productivity in 
  
6 
the subsequent period by Mi + ηi, where ηi is revealed to the firm at the end period i-1.  
Over the time, the human capital is assumed to appreciate at the rate of δ.  The worker's 
job satisfaction θi is revealed to the worker at the end of period i-1. Without loss of 
generality, the discount rate is set to zero.  Hours in period i is denoted by hi with the 
worker's associated disutilities represented by D(hi).  In period 1, h1 and w1 are 
determined on the open competitive market. 
 
3. Joint wealth maximisation with a retirement constraint 
The expected joint wealth V is the sum of the wealth over three periods that the 
worker is in the labour force: 
  
 V = V1 + V2 + V3.                                        (3) 
 
We begin, in sub-sections (a) and (b), by detailing the compositions of the constituent 
parts of V in (3).  Table 1 provides a comprehensive summary of this discussion. 
 
(a) Periods 1 and 2 
A two-period time line of quasi rent is illustrated in Figure 1.  Since returns to 
training investments are not realised until period 2, wealth in period 1 consists of wage 
earnings net of specific training cost and the disutility of working; thus 
  
                            V1 = w1.h1 - C(M2) - D(h1).                                (4)  
 
Combining periods 1 and 2, the parties' joint wealth consists of the returns arising 
from three mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, weighted by the probability of their 
occurrence.  The worker may be fired or not-fired at the end of period 1.  In the event of 
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the worker not being fired, separation may occur due to a quit decision or the 
employment relationship may continue.  In all three outcomes the first period rent 
consists of wage compensation net of training cost and work disutility (w1.h - C - D(h)).  
If the worker is fired or voluntarily quits, the firm itself cannot obtain second period rent.  
If the worker remains with the firm, second period rent differs from the first period due 
enhanced productivity and job satisfaction as well as to the fact that second-period hours 
may differ from those in the first period. 
 
 
 
     
 
                     
 
 
If the worker leaves the firm at the end of period 1, it is either through quitting or 
being fired.  To avoid excessive complexity, we make the assumption that, if either type 
of separation occurs, the worker will not subsequently rejoin the firm.  For subsequent 
wages, hours and costs, we assign subscripts 'q' and 'f' to denote, respectively, quit and 
firing decisions.  We assume that if the worker is fired then this is regarded by potential 
employers as a signal that skills have not been acquired to a satisfactory level.  In this 
event, he will not receive a higher return based on acquired human capital in firm 1.  
General human capital, after allowing depreciation, is (1-δ).w1 with expected working 
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Figure 1: Time line of quasi-rent 
Fired   [prob. F2] 
Quit [prob. (1-F2).Q2] 
Stay [prob. (1-F2).(1-Q2)] 
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hours h2f.  The worker will also incur training costs, Cf.  If the worker quits the firm, he 
will obtain a proportion of human capital, g.M2, which is useful for the outside job.  His 
general human capital is (1-δ).w1 + g.M2, expected working hours is h2q and training cost 
is Cq.   Finally, if he stays in the current firm, he will gain the full amount of the increase 
of human capital, M2.  
 
Taken together, these three possibilities at the end of the initial training period lead to V2 
being expressed as the sum of returns of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive events: 
V2 = F2.[(1-δ).w1.h2f - Cf -D(h2f)]        (the worker is fired at the end of period 1)     
 
+(1-F2).Q2.{[(1-δ).w1+ g.M2].h2q -Cq-D(h2q)}  (the worker quits at the end of period 1)  
 
+(1-F2).(1-Q2).{[(1-δ).w1+M2+E(η2|η2>η2*) +E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)].h2 - C(M3) - D(h2) } 
                           (the worker stays at the end of period 1)         (5) 
where D(.) is the disutility of working. 
 
(b) Period 3 
In period 3, the pre-retirement period, the worker reaches an age where no further 
training takes place.  The wealth of period 3, V3, is conditional on whether, at the end of 
period 1, the worker was either fired (Vf ), or quit the firm (Vq) or stayed with the firm 
(Vs), i.e. V3 = Vf +Vq +Vs (see Table 1).  Recall that if separation takes place (quit or 
layoff) then the worker will not return to the firm.  We discuss each possibility in turn. 
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(i) The worker is fired at the end of period 1 
 The expected period 3 income from an outside job is given by  
Vf  = F2.[ w3f.h3ff - D(h3ff)]      (6) 
where (w3f, h3ff) is the expected wage-hour contract with w3f = w1.(1-δ)2 + M3f, where M3f 
is the expected increase of human capital stemming from period 2 training. 
 
(ii) The worker quits at the end of period 1 
The expected outside job income is given by 
 
 Vq = (1-F2).Q2.{[(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2 ).(1-δ) + M3q].h3qq - D(h3qq)}         (7) 
 
where [(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2 ).(1-δ) + M3q] is the expected contract wage,  h3qq is the 
expected  hours of work and M3q is the expected increase of human capital. 
 
(iii) The worker stays at the end of period 1 
In this event, Vs is expressed further as the sum of returns of three mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive events similar to V2 (see Table 1) 
 
Vs = (1-F2).(1-Q2).F3.[(1-δ).w1.+g.M2 ).(1-δ).h3f -D(h3f)]  
            (the worker is fired at the end of period 2)     
    
     +(1-F2).(1-Q2).(1-F3).Q3.{[(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2).(1-δ)+g.M3].h3q- D(h3q)}  
       (the worker quits at the end of period 2)  
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        +(1-F2).(1-Q2).(1-F3).(1-Q3).{[(w1.(1-δ) + M2).(1-δ)+ M3 + E(η3|η3>η3*)        
  
+E(θ3|θ3>θ3*)].h3 - D(h3) }  (the worker stays at the end of period 2)      (8) 
 
where h3f and h3q are the expected hours outside the firm if the worker is fired or quits, 
respectively. 
 
 (c) Model solutions 
We deal first with periods 1 and 2.  From the first-order conditions to the problem of 
maximising wealth in (5) - derived in Theory Appendix (a) – we obtain 
 
 w2 = (1-δ).w1 + M2 + E(η2|η2>η2*) > w1               (9) 
and 
 α-Q2.[β+γ.g.M2]-(1-Q2).[ h2.E(θ2|θ2>θ2*) -C(M3)-D(h2) 
   + [τ+g.M2.(1-δ).h3f ] + w2.h2] = 0.               (10) 
 
Derivations of (9) and (10) are given in Results Appendix (b).  
Expression (9) provides the well known outcome, illustrated in Figure 2 (a), that 
the contractual wage rate rises with tenure, or w2* > w1.  Similar to the proof in Hart and 
Ma (2000), we can also show that working hours allocated in the post-investment period, 
conditional on satisfying a marginal disutility constraint, also rise relative to period 1 
hours, or h2* > h1. Thus, we have the hours profile illustrated in Figure 2 (b). 
An optimal solution to the problem of maximising wealth in (8) cannot be attained 
through the choice of a single hourly wage rate, however.  The problem is that the parties  
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Table 1    Expected life-time wealth 
 
Period 1 (V1) Period 2  (V2) Period 3    (V3 = Vf + Vq + Vs) Period 4 
Probability =1.0 Fired:  probability = F2  Probability = F2  Vf Retirement 
w1.h1 – C(M2) –
D(h1) 
(1-δ).w1.h2f – Cf –D(h2f)  w3f.h3ff - D(h3ff)   
 Quits:  probability = (1-F2).Q2  Probability = (1-F2).Q2 Vq  
  [(1-δ).w1+g.M2].h2q –
Cq-D(h2q)  
  [(w1.(1-δ)+ g.M2 ).(1-δ) + M3q].h3qq   - D(h3qq)   
                 Fired:  probability = (1-F2).(1-Q2).F3  
 
 
 Stays:  probability = 
(1-F2).(1-Q2) 
V2 [w1.(1-δ)+g.M2].(1-δ).h3f -D(h3f)           Vs  
 [(1-δ).w1+M2+E(η2|η2>η2*)  Quits:  probability = (1-F2).(1-Q2).(1-F3).Q3   
 +E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)].h2 –C(M3)-
D(h2) 
 [(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2).(1-δ)+g.M3].h3q- D(h3q)   
   Stays:  probability = (1-F2).(1-Q2).(1-F3).(1-Q3)   
   [(w1.(1-δ) + M2).(1-δ)+ M3 + 
E(η3|η3>η3*)+E(θ3|θ3>θ3*)].h3  
- D(h3) 
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are seeking to minimise sub-optimal quits and layoffs, with an eye towards the outside 
wage, as well as achieving the optimal length of working hours.  Intuitively, at least 
two instruments are required in order to achieve these mutually supportive objectives. 
Hart and Ma (2000) establish that if an “overtime” premium is paid then contract 
efficiency is established.  This does not rule out the use of other instruments, such as 
bonus payments (Hashimoto, 1979) or fixed seniority promotion rules (Carmichael, 
1983).     
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now deal with period 3.  A summary of the expected lifetime wealth, 
together with the first-order conditions (f.o.c's) for wealth maximisation are set out in 
the Results Appendix (a).  From the f.o.c's (A3) to (A6), it is easily established that 
workers will quit whenever satisfaction is below θi* ; that is,  
 θ2 < θ2* =[β+γ.g.M2]/ h2 - [A/h2+ E(η2|η2>η2*)]            (11) 
and 
 θ3 < θ3* =  [µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q+g.M3.h3q]/h3 - [B/h3 + Eη3|η3>η3*)]. (12) 
 
Further, the firm will fire the workers whenever productivity is below ηi* ; that is  
1 12 2
w2*
h1
h2*
Figure 2: Wage and hours  profiles
(a) (b)
hourly wage rate
wa
hours
period period
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            η2 < η2* ={α-Q2.[β+γ.g.M2]}/[h2.(1-Q2)] - [A/h2+ E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)]       (13) 
and 
   η3  < η3* ={[τ+g.M2.(1-δ).h3f ] - Q3.[µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q +g.M3.h3q] }/ 
                [h3.(1-Q3)] - [B/h3 + E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)]                (14) 
 
These results state that the party wishing to separate must be made to internalise the 
entire expected losses from the separation at each period over the working life.  
Next we show that it is possible to formulate a wage-hour contract in terms of 
the parameters of ηi* and θi* to satisfy the first-order conditions (A3) to (A6).  For 
period 3, there exists a wage-hour contract which can minimise the sub-optimal 
separation of the two parties, with (w3*, h3*), satisfying the following two equations: 
 
 w3 = (1-δ)2.w1 + M2.(1-δ) + M3 + E(η3|η3>η3*)                   (15) 
and 
 [τ+g.M2.(1-δ).h3f ] - Q3.[µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q+g.M3.h3q]  
   - (1-Q3).[ h3.E(θ3|θ3>θ3*) -D(h3) + w3.h3] = 0       (16) 
 
Equations (15) and (16) are derived in Theory Appendix (c).  
 
4 Life cycle changes in investments, wages and hours 
The optimal wage-hour contract (w2*, h2*, w3*, h3*) the level of human 
capital investments (M2*, M3*) are obtained by solving equations (9), (10), (15), (16), 
(A7) and (A8) simultaneously.  In this section, we investigate four sets of questions 
that arise from these solutions. What are the implications of our model for  
(a) the level of human capital investment over the life cycle; 
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(b) the level of hours over the life cycle; 
(c) the income effect on hours in the post-investment period compared to the      
previous period; 
(d) the effects on wages and hours life-time schedules of separation before period 3? 
We deal with each issue in turn. 
 
(a) Human capital investments 
We might expect that, given the retirement constraint, the optimal level of 
human capital produced by the training investments will rise initially and then fall as 
the worker becomes older.  In effect, for given investments, the age of retirement 
serves to shorten the potential length of amortisation of period 2 compared to period 1 
investments. We show formally in the Theory Appendix (d) that such an outcome is 
predicted by the model.  Providing quit and layoff probabilities as well as the 
depreciation rate are small, we obtain the outcome 
 
                             M2 > M3 > 0                (17) 
 
that is, returns to human capital investments that are realised in period 3 are less than 
those realised in period 2.  Ceteris paribus, our results suggest that wages and hours 
rise with experience due to rent sharing and, moreover, the two profiles are concave.  
In terms of the wage rate, the analysis provides a theoretical underpinning of the slope 
and shape of the Mincer-equation (Mincer, 1974).  
(b) Hours 
There are four explicit conditions and one implicit condition to guarantee that 
h3 rises above h2 (see Hart and Ma, 2000): 
(i) outside working hours are not far away from h3; 
(ii) the quit probability Q3 is not too high; 
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(iii) the marginal disutility of work D′(h3) is not too large; 
(iv) D(0) = 0, D′(.) > 0 and D′′(.) > 0; 
(v) w3 > w2.  
 
Conditions (ii) and (iv) may well hold in period 3 as the worker is approaching 
retirement.  However, (i) and (iii) may not hold.  This implies hours may fall in the 
pre-retirement period, independent of the wage.  Furthermore, condition (v) may not 
hold in period 3 either.3  This again implies that the hours may fall in period 3. 
 
(c) Income effects on hours 
 
In order to gain a deeper insight into period 3 relative to period 2 hours, we 
need to consider the income effect on hours.  From equation (10) we have 
 
 ∂log(h2)/∂log(w2) = -w2/[ w2+E(θ2⏐θ2>θ2*) - D′(h2)]           (18) 
 
While by equation (16) we have 
 
 ∂log(h3)/∂log(w3) = -w3/[ w3+E(θ3⏐θ3>θ3*) - D′(h3)]           (19) 
 
Comparing (18) and (19), we can find that the following three factors increase the 
income effect of period 3, relative to that of period 2.  These are: 
 
(i) w3 < w2; 
                                 
3 What can we say about the expected value of w3 relative to w2?  Consider equation (15).  It is clear 
that there are two influences on the value of w3 that serve to render the outcome relative to w2 as an 
open empirical question. From (15), if there were no human capital investment in period 2, with the 
result that M3 = 0, then we would unequivocally obtain w3 < w2 due to the effect of the investment 
depreciation term, δ.   But M3 > 0 does not ensure the reverse wage inequality because we have 
established in (17) that human capital investment M3 will be less than M2.  In other words, it would 
remain the case that w3 < w2 if the investment M3 falls steeply enough so as not to offset the human 
capital depreciation.  Therefore, relative sizes of w3 and w2 cannot be determined a priori.  
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(ii) θ3 < θ2, i.e. job satisfaction may be lower when a worker gets older; 
(iii) D′(h3) < D′(h2) if h3 < h2.  
 
(d) Separation before period 3 
Suppose that we distinguish between two groups of workers.  The first group 
consists of individuals who changed their last job relatively late in their working 
lifetime and who will have short expected tenure (SET).  The second group’s last job 
change is at an age that still leaves relatively long expected tenure (LET).4 The wage 
profiles of these two groups are likely to differ.  Consider first the implication for 
human capital investment in (a).  We would expect in (17) that M3 will fall relative to 
M2 for the SET group considerably more than the LET group as approaching 
retirement will preclude significant period 2 investments. In relation to wage 
outcomes in (b), therefore, we would conclude that there is a far greater chance that 
w3 < w2 for the SET group compared to the LET group.  
The hours profiles may also contrast between the two groups but in this case 
the picture is more complicated.  Suppose, for example, that the conditions listed 
under the hours effect in (c) and under the income effect in (d) are small except for w3  
< w2.  This latter result would serve to depress hours but this would be counteracted 
by the income effect.  
In the empirical estimation reported in Section 6, we examine the 
consequences of distinguishing between SET and LET groups. 
                                 
4 In a theoretical and empirical analysis in which human capital investments play a key part, Hübler 
(1989) explores the optimal number of job moves over work histories. 
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5 Estimation 
(a)  Wage and hours estimating equations 
We use BHPS data on full-time males observed annually from 1991 to 2003.  An 
advantage of using British data is that the labour market is more or less unregulated as far as 
working time is concerned.  The lengths of standard and total weekly hours are generally not 
subject to statutory interference.5  Variable definitions are given in the Data Appendix. 
From equation (9), we predict that the wage rate rises with the acquisition of general 
and specific human capital. We also predict (see discussion around (17)) that the profile will 
be concave. We use work experience as a proxy for the combined returns to general and 
specific investments.  For J employed individuals (indexed by j = 1,…,J), we have 
                                                   
                                             log wjt = xjta + yjtb + µj + ejt                                                  (20) 
 
where wjt is the hourly straight-time wage rate6 for individual i at time t, x is a vector 
of the individual’s human capital attributes (work experience) and y contains other 
control variables (marital status, firm-size, industry and year dummies); a and b are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated; µj represents individual fixed effects and ej is a 
zero-mean random variable reflecting unobserved characteristics that affect the wage 
offer. 
                                 
5 Minimum hourly premiums for hours in excess of regular hours are also not subject to legislation.  
Unfortunately, we have no direct information on premium rates for individuals in the BHPS and so 
they are not included in the analysis. Instead, we focus our study on straight-time wage rates and total 
hours equations which, taken jointly, provide lower bound estimates a earnings effects. 
   
6 Paid-for basic hourly wage rates are not directly provided in the BHPS and they were derived on the 
following basis.  Omitting cross-section subscripts, w = [gross weekly earnings]/{basic weekly hours + 
[(overtime hours) × 1.25]}.  The overtime premium of 1.25 is based on estimates by Hart and Ruffell 
(1993) for males in British production industries.  These authors show that the premium remains 
unaffected by variations in the length of weekly hours. 
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From equation (10), we establish that hours also rise with work experience.  
Longer hours are consistent with greater turnover efficiency in the face of sunk 
investments.  The hours-equivalent equation to (20) is expressed: 
 
                                             log hjt = zjtc + yjtd + υj + ujt                                                  (21) 
 
where h is weekly hours; z  represents the work experience and - as dictated by 
equation (10) - the straight-time wage; y are the same controls as in (20); c and d are 
vectors of parameters; υ represents fixed effects; u is the error term.  
Our data set contains both employed and unemployed persons.  Given the 
potential for sample selection bias, we adopt the Heckman (1979) two-step procedure.  
The probability of being unemployed is estimated in an auxiliary probit regression 
where the sample of both employed and unemployed is included.  The explanatory 
variables in the probit consisted of the individual's age, marital status and category of 
child dependency.  From the probit, we obtained an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio 
which is added as an additional variable in the wage and hours specification, (20) and 
(21).  
 
(b)  Simulations 
In order to evaluate the contributions of total experience on the wage rate and 
hours profiles, as well as on wage earnings (i.e. the wage rate times hours), we carried 
out a simple simulation exercise.  Suppose a worker enters a firm immediately after 
schooling and remains in the firm, without unemployment spells or other major non-
vacation breaks, until the age of retirement. How much would wage rates, weekly 
hours and wage earnings rise with accumulated years of tenure (= experience)?  Based 
on our estimates of equation (20), let aˆ 1 be the estimated coefficient on the 
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experience variable, EXP and 2αˆ  the coefficient on EXP2 within the a vector.  Then, 
we can evaluate 
      .(EXP)aa
(EXP)
)w( j
21 ˆ2ˆ
log +=∂
∂
.            (22)   
In the estimated hours equation (21), let bˆ 1 be the estimated coefficient on EXP, bˆ 2 
on EXP2, and bˆ 3 the coefficient on the wage in the b vector.  Then, we have  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡++
(EXP)
)w(
.b.(EXP)bb=
(EXP)
)h( jj
∂
∂
∂
∂ logˆˆ2ˆlog 321  .                (23) 
Combining these wage rate and hours simulations allows us to evaluate the 
growth rates of wage earnings that are attributable to work experience. Note, however, 
that these are lower bound earnings estimates because we are assuming implicitly that 
all weekly hours are compensated at the straight-time wage rate, wt. For many 
workers, marginal weekly hours are paid at an overtime premium.  Our construction 
assumes that this premium rate is 1 which clearly underestimates the true figure.  
Elsewhere, we establish theoretically that the overtime premium itself will relate to 
human capital investments and may serve to reduce sub-optimal separations given 
sunk investments (Hart and Ma, 2000).  
 
(c) SET and LET dichotomies 
Following the discussion in Section 4 (d), we differentiated between 
individuals with short expected tenure (SET) and those with long expected tenure 
(LET).  We argued that our theoretical developments would lead us to expect to 
observe different wage and hours returns to experience for the two groups as well as 
different income effects.  Dividing individuals into SET and LET groups is, of 
necessity, a somewhat arbitrary process.  We adopted a simple heuristic approach.  
We experimented with job-change ages within middle aged groups (between 40 and 
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55) in order to find an 'optimum' dividing age. The optimum age was simply the 
choice that maximised the estimated differences in experience and hours-wage 
coefficients between the two groups.  It turned out that the age was 44.  Accordingly, 
all those changing job at age 44 and above were treated as the SET group with the 
remainer the LET group.  
Letting D be a dichotomous variable that represents the dividing age, our 
modified versions of (20) and (21) are given by  
 
log wjt = xjta1 + D.xjta2 + yjtb + µj + ejt                                                  (24) 
and 
          log hjt = zjtc1 + D.zjtc2 + yjtd + υj + ujt .                                                    (25) 
 
 
6 Results  
The estimates in columns (i) and (iii) of Table 2 establish, in line with our 
theory, that both wage rates and weekly hours rise with work experience.  Moreover, 
both components of earnings exhibit concave profiles.  As in many previous supply-
side and wage contract models, we obtain a negative income effect in respect of the 
straight-time wage.   From Table 2 and Figure 3, we find from the simulations - i.e. 
equations (22) and (23) - that a worker receives 11.6 growth in the hourly wage rate 
by the fifth year of experience.  By 20 years of experience, such growth reaches  33.5 
per cent before declining somewhat over the ensuing 10 years. But hours also rise 
over the life cycle: in other words, the experience effect is greater than the income 
effect.  After 5 years, hours grow 1.3 per cent due to experience and by year 30 hours 
growth peaks at 5.0 per cent.  Combining the two simulations in order to establish the 
earnings-experience profile, we find that the wage-rate growth from 11.6 per cent 
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after 5 years rises to 13.0 per cent in terms of wage earnings. After 25 years, the 
respective percentages are 30.5 and 36.8.  
Table 2: Wage and hours fixed effects regressions and simulations  
               (BHPS: 1991-2003) 
 
 Basic wage (ln w) Hours (ln h) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Experience 0.030* 
(0.005) 
0.032* 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.002) 
0.011* 
(0.003) 
Experience2/100 -0.083* 
(0.002) 
-0.087* 
(0.003) 
-0.022* 
(0.001) 
-0.026* 
(0.001) 
Wage 
  
- - -0.193* 
(0.001) 
-0.198* 
(0.003) 
Mills -0.292 
(0.267) 
-0.285 
(0.267) 
0.007 
(0.135) 
0.012 
(0.135) 
D  
 
0.155* 
(0.058) 
 -0.012 
(0.033) 
D.Experience  
 
-0.015* 
(0.004) 
 -0.005* 
(0.002) 
D.(Experience2/100)  
 
0.027* 
(0.006) 
 0.009* 
(0.003) 
D.Wage  
 
-  0.021* 
(0.005) 
Sample size 31976 
Notes:  * denotes statistically significant at 0.01 level.  Brackets below 
coefficients contain standard errors. Regressions include dummies for years, 2-
digit industries, firm size (1-24 workers, 25-49, and over 50), whether living with 
partner, number of children (see Data Appendix). The dummy variable D takes 
the value of 1 for those workers who changed job at age 44 and older. 
  
Percentage growth in wage rates, weekly hours and wage earnings attributable to 
work experience 
Experience 
(years) 
 
Wage rates (wt) Weekly hours (ht) Wage earnings (wt.ht) 
5 11.6 1.3 13.0 
10 23.4 2.7 26.7 
15 31.0 3.7 35.9 
20 33.5 4.9 39.4 
25 30.5 4.9 36.8 
30 22.3 5.0 28.3 
Notes: These figures show the percentage differences between the current values 
of wages, hours and earnings and their respective starting values due to total 
experience.  Figure 2 provides corresponding graphs covering all years. 
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Figure 3  Wage/Hours-Experience Profiles
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Figure 4  Extent of the Wage Effect on the Hours Profile
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Recall from equation (23) that the hours profile is generated by accounting for 
a direct positive effect of experience on hours and an indirect negative income (wage) 
effect.   How influential is the latter to the shape of the overall profile?  Figure 4 
shows the hours profile in respect of the combined experience and wage effects (i.e. 
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corresponding to the equivalent profile in Figure (2)) and the profile predicted if there 
were no wage effect.7 Clearly, the wage effect has a substantial influence.  As 
examples, hours growth after 10 years is predicted to be 7 per cent if only experience 
is accounted for and 2.7 per cent when the wage effect is additionally incorporated 
while, after 20 years, the respective percentages are 10.5 and 4.5. 
We suggested in Section 3 (e) that sharper evidence in relation to our 
theoretical predictions may be derived by separating individuals into those with short 
expected tenure (SET) and long expected tenure (LET).  Based on fairly crude 
heuristics, we defined a SET worker as someone who changed job (at least once) at 
age 44 or above.  Those who changed jobs at an earlier age, or not at all, were defined 
to be LET workers.   
We first predicted in respect of wage rates that returns to experience within the 
SET group would be expected to be less than within the LET group. Our results in 
column (ii), Table 2 support this expectation.  The shift dummy indicates significantly 
higher absolute wages for the SET group because this consists, on average, of older 
workers.8  When interacted with the experience variable, however, the SET group 
displays a significantly lower experience effect on wage growth than its LET 
equivalent.  In the hours’ equations (column (iv)), the shift dummy is insignificantly 
different from zero.  As for the effect of experience on hours, the estimates indicate a 
lower hours' response among SET compared to LET workers.  The net experience 
effect remains positive for the SET group, however. As for as the interacted 
SET/wage dummy, the income effect is slightly weaker in the SET compared to the 
                                 
7 That is, simply, the predicted profile after setting 0ˆ3 =b in equation (23). 
8 As pointed out by the Reviewer, this explanation is weakened to the extent that our experience 
variables are capturing age effects.  An alternative explanation for the positive coefficient on the shift 
dummy of the SET group is that members of this group have had more job moves in their careers 
thereby attaining better-paying job matches. 
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LET group.  We set out the conditions in Section 3 (d) that combine to bring about 
this outcome. 
 
6 Concluding remarks  
Investments in general and specific human capital earn an expected rent in the 
post-investment period.  The rent payment to workers has two dimensions.  It can be 
paid in the form of (a) an increment to the wage rate (b) longer per-period hours. We 
show that, under reasonable conditions, both modes of payment serve to improve 
contract efficiency in terms of minimising sub-optimal separations in the face of 
informational asymmetries.  Empirical support is obtained from related Mincer 
equations estimated on data relating to British male workers. Over the working life 
cycle, the positive effect of rent sharing on hours growth is estimated to be larger than 
the countervailing negative income effect.  This is an important finding in relation to 
previous empirical literature on hours of work. 
There is an obvious empirical extension to this work.  Data limitations have 
prevented us from integrating the role of premium pay into our empirics.  
Accordingly, our resulting wage earnings growth profiles are lower bounds. Some 
part of the hours growth due to human capital investments will involve payment of an 
overtime premium.  Elsewhere, we have shown that payment of a premium on 
marginal per-period hours worked serves as a device that helps to further to reduce 
sub-optimal separations by the two parties.  As and when data sets become available 
that allow researchers to measure marginal premium rates of pay, along with work 
experience, then estimates of wage earnings returns to human capital investments may 
be further refined.
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Theory Appendix 
(a)  Wealth maximisation: first-order conditions 
To summarise, we have (where ti means the end of period i):  
V=V1 +V2 + V3 = V1 +V2 + Vf + Vq + Vs : 
   = w1.h1 - C(M2)-D(h1)                 (wealth in period 1) 
       + F2.[(1-δ).w1.h2f - Cf -D(h2f)]  + w3f.h3ff - D(h3ff)   (fired at t1) 
      +(1-F2).Q2.{[(1-δ).w1+g.M2].h2q -Cq-D(h2q) 
   + [(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2 ).(1-δ) + M3q].h3qq  - D(h3qq)} (quits at t1) 
      +(1-F2).(1-Q2).{[(1-δ).w1+M2+E(η2|η2>η2*) +E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)].h2 - C(M3) - 
D(h2) }         (stays at t1) 
     + (1-F2).(1-Q2).{ F3.[(w1.(1-δ)+g.M2 ).(1-δ).h3f -D(h3f)]        (fired at t2)     
 + (1-F3).Q3.{[(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2).(1-δ)+g.M3].h3q- D(h3q)}(quits at t2)  
  + (1-F3).(1-Q3).{[(w1.(1-δ) + M2).(1-δ)+ M3 + E(η3|η3>η3*)  
  +E(θ3|θ3>θ3*)].h3 - D(h3)}}         (stays at t2)               (A1) 
where w1, w3f , h1, h2f , h2q , h3f , h3ff , h3q and M3q are exogenously determined 
constants. 
To simplify the notation, let 
 ϕ= w1.h1 -D(h1)   
 α= (1-δ).w1.h2f - Cf -D(h2f) + w3f.h3ff - D(h3ff) 
 β=(1-δ).w1.h2q -Cq-D(h2q) + [(1-δ)2.w1 + M3q].h3qq  - D(h3qq) 
 γ=h2q + (1-δ).h3qq     
 τ=(1-δ)2.w1.h3f -D(h3f) 
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 µ=w1.(1-δ)2.h3q- D(h3q) 
 B=[(w1.(1-δ) + M2).(1-δ)+ M3].h3 - D(h3) 
 A=[(1-δ).w1+M2].h2 - C(M3) - D(h2) + F3.[τ+g.M2.(1-δ).h3f ]   
  + (1-F3).Q3.[µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q +g.M3.h3q]  
  + (1-F3).(1-Q3).{B + [E(η3|η3>η3*)+E(θ3|θ3>θ3*)].h3 }       (A2) 
where ϕ, α, β, γ, τ, and µ are constants. 
The first order conditions satisfying max V are ∂V/∂θi* = ∂V/∂ηi* = 0 (i=2,3): 
∂V/∂/η2* =f(η2*).{α-Q2.[β+γ.g.M2] -(1-Q2).[A+ h2.E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)]  
                        - (1-Q2).h2.η2* } = 0                        (A3) 
∂V/∂/θ2* = (1-F2).q(θ2*).{[β+γ.g.M2] - [A+ h2.E(η2|η2>η2*)] - h2.θ2* } = 0  (A4) 
and 
∂V/∂/η3* =f(η2*).{[τ+g.M2.(1-δ).h3f ] - Q3.[µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q +g.M3.h3q] 
  -(1-Q3).[B+ h2.E(θ2|θ2>θ2*)] - (1-Q3).h3.η3* } = 0         (A5) 
 
∂V/∂/θ3*=(1-F3).q(θ3*).{ [µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q+g.M3.h3q] 
  - [B+h3.E(η3|η3>η3*)] - h3.θ3* } = 0                                 (A6) 
 
(b)  Period 2 wage-hour contract 
The optimal period 2 wage-hour contract is obtained as follows.  If the firm decides to 
fire a worker at the end of period 1, then  
 (1-δ).w1 + M2 + η2 < w2  
or 
  η2 < η2* = w2 - (1-δ).w1 - M2  (A7) 
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Substituting (A7) into f.o.c. (A3) gives (10). 
 
On the other hand, the worker will quit at the end of period 1 if 
  
h2.w2 + h2.θ2 - D(h2) -C(M3) + Vs  < {[(1-δ).w1+g.M2].h2q -Cq-D(h2q) 
 + [(w1.(1-δ) + g.M2 ).(1-δ) + M3q].h3qq  - D(h3qq)} (A8) 
 
The worker is assumed to be forward looking. He therefore considers current returns, 
[h2.w2 + h2.θ2 - D(h2) -C(M3)], as well as future returns, Vs, if he stays with the 
firm at period 2 when he makes his decision.  The right-hand-side of the above 
inequality is the sum of the wealth over periods 2 and 3 if the worker quits. 
Rewrite (A8): 
  
θ2 < θ2* = - w2 + [β+γ.g.M2 + D(h2) +C(M3) - Vs]/h2 (A9) 
 
Substituting (A9) into f.o.c. (A4) gives (9) if M2 is sufficiently large or δ is relatively 
small. 
 
(c)  Period 3 wage-hour contract 
If the firm decides to fire a worker at the end of period 2, then 
  (1-δ)2.w1 + M2.(1-δ) + M3 + η3 < w3  
or 
  η3 < η3* = - [(1-δ)2.w1 + M2.(1-δ) + M3 - w3] (A10) 
 
Substituting (A10) into (A5) gives (16). 
 
On the other hand, the worker will quit at the end of period 2 if 
 h3.w3 + h3.θ 3 - D(h3) < [µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q+g.M3.h3q]    
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or 
 θ< θ* = - w3 - {D(h3) - [µ+ g.M2.(1-δ).h3q+g.M3.h3q]}/h3 (A11) 
Substituting (A11) into (A6) gives (15). 
 
(d)  Human capital investment over the life cycle 
The first-order conditions satisfying max V are ∂V/∂Mi = 0 (i=2,3) are given by 
 
∂V/∂M2 = -C'(M2) +(1-F2).Q2.γ.g +(1-F2 ).(1-Q2).[ h2 +g.F3.(1-δ).h3f  
    + g.(1-F3).Q3.(1-δ).h3q+(1-F3).(1-Q3).(1-δ).h3] = 0          (A12) 
 
∂V/∂M3 = (1-F2 ).(1-Q2).[ -C'(M3) + g.(1-F3).Q3.h3q+ (1-F3).(1-Q3).h3] = 0.(A13) 
 
Equations (A12) and (A13) imply that  
  
C'(M2) - C'(M3) = (1-F2).Q2.γ.g +(1-F2 ).(1-Q2).[ h2 +g.F3.(1-δ).h3f ] 
 - δ(1-F2 ).(1-Q2).(1-F3).[g.Q3.h3q+(1-Q3).h3]  
 - (F3+Q3 - F3.Q3).(1-F3).[g.Q3.(1-δ).h3q+(1-Q3).(1-δ).h3] > 0 (A14) 
if Fi , Qi (i=2,3) and δ are small.  Therefore, we have  
 
                             M2 > M3 > 0.            
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Data Appendix 
Variable definitions in respect of the results shown in Table 2 are as follows.  (In 
addition, regressions include year dummies.) 
 Variable Definition 
Wage straight-time hourly wage rate (see footnote 5) 
Hours individual’s total weekly paid-for hours 
Exp age of individual minus age when completed full-time education 
Partner 0 = married or living together      1 = single, widowed, divorced, 
separated 
chil 0 no dependent children under 19 
chil 1* youngest dependent child is between 0 and 3   (0 and 4) 
chil 2 youngest dependent child is between 5 and 11 (4 and 11) 
chil 3 youngest dependent child is between 12 and 18 
size 0* 1 - 24 employees at workplace 
size 1 25 - 49 employees at workplace 
size 2 50 or more employees at workplace 
ind 1 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
ind 2 Energy & water supplies 
ind 3* Mineral extraction metals & chemicals 
ind 4 Metal goods, engineering & vehicles 
ind 5 Other manufacturing 
ind 6 Construction 
ind 7 Distribution, hotels & catering 
ind 8 Transport & communication 
ind 9 Banking, finance, insurance, business services & leasing 
ind 10 Other services 
Note:  * indicates the omitted variable in regression analyses.   
 
 
 
